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A B S T R A C T
During 1999–2007, a labour-led but broad-based socio-economic rights move-
ment, which focused on a pro-poor (and therefore highly popular) anti-fuel price
hike message, persuaded and/or pressured Nigeria’s federal legislature, the
National Assembly, to : mediate between it and the Executive Branch of Govern-
ment ; take it seriously enough to lobby it repeatedly ; re-orient its legislative
processes ; explicitly oppose virtually all of the Executive Branch’s fuel price hikes ;
and reject key anti-labour provisions in a government bill. Yet the movement did
not always succeed in its efforts to influence the National Assembly. This article
maps, discusses, contextualises and analyses these generally remarkable devel-
opments. It also argues that while many factors combined to facilitate or militate
against the movement’s impact on legislative reasoning, process and action dur-
ing the relevant period, this movement’s ‘mass social movement ’ character was
the pivotal factor that afforded it the necessary leverage to exert considerable, if
limited, influence on the National Assembly.
* For the generous funds that made this study possible, I am grateful to the Social Science and
Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC). I should like to thank Obiora Anozie, Chikeziri
Igwe, Opeoluwa Ogundokun, Tony Ceaser Okeke and Pius Okoronkwo for their excellent research
assistance. The two anonymous reviewers also deserve my gratitude for suggestions that significantly
improved the article.
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
The principal goal of this article is to map, contextualise and analyse the
significance of the remarkable influence on legislative reasoning, process
and action (hereafter ‘ legislative work’) that a labour-led socio-economic
rights movement (hereafter ‘ the movement’) which extended well beyond
the traditional labour alliances was able to exert in Nigeria between 1999
and 2007. Utilising two key examples (the movement’s influence on the
Nigerian legislature’s reactions to the executive branch’s fuel price hikes,
and its impact on an important government legislative bill), the article
shows that the sustained anti-fuel price hike-focused socio-economic
rights struggle (hereafter ‘ the struggle ’) which this movement waged
during the period under study was a critical factor that has shaped and
oriented important aspects of both the corporate behaviour of Nigeria’s
bi-cameral federal legislature (the National Assembly), and the individual
positions held by many of the legislators who constitute that body.1 The
article also demonstrates the ways in which certain factors (mostly
related to the orientation and mode of struggle of this movement) fa-
cilitated the movement’s ability to exert influence on the National As-
sembly in respect of the specific matters on which it focuses. The factors
that have militated against the movement’s success in those areas are also
discussed.
In large part because of the movement’s dogged struggles, legislative
work within the National Assembly was: (a) focused more intensely, un-
relentingly, and favourably than would ordinarily have been the case on
the negative popular reaction of most ordinary Nigerians to the very vexed
question of the federal executive branch’s incessant increases in the price
of motor vehicle fuel ; and (b) shaped and oriented in the direction pre-
ferred by the movement. As importantly, in large measure as a result of
this movement’s activist campaigns, important alterations were made by
the National Assembly to a key Executive Branch bill that had been in-
tended to weaken a reinvigorated, resistant and powerful movement.
As such, the main hypothesis that will be explored in this article is that,
between 1999 and 2007, the movement exerted a considerable (albeit
limited) measure of influence on the Nigerian legislature, and that the
movement’s mass social movement orientation was – far more than any other
factor – responsible for facilitating the influence that it exerted in the rel-
evant respects. By its mass social movement orientation is meant the fact
that the movement had a pro-poor orientation; cultivated and enjoyed a
broad-based membership and support ; was largely self-funded; and pri-
marily deployed a mass action-centred mode of struggle – a definition that
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is adapted from Neil Stammers (1999). The article also suggests that strong
external incentives combined with internal factors to inhibit the move-
ment’s drive towards even greater success.
On a methodological note, it must be noted that the argument made in
this article is not a causal one (Ruggie 1995: 94). Rather, the movement’s
struggles and efforts have tended to constitute ‘one critical (even pivotal)
factor ’ in the production of the observed and desired changes, and in the
production of other observed effects (Okafor 2004: 24). On another
methodological note, this article is limited in both its subject matter con-
centration and temporal focus. In the first case, it is circumscribed by its
concentration, for reasons of space and parsimony, on two specific ex-
amples that tell the broader story of the influence exerted by the move-
ment on the federal legislature in Nigeria. And secondly, it is hemmed in
by its focus on the period between 1999 and 2007, the first eight years of
Nigeria’s fourth republic : a period in which that country engaged in the
latest of its many attempts at democratic governance, and one which was
also marked by the re-emergence of the movement as a major national
political and social force.
In order to systematically explore its hypothesis, the remainder of the
article is organised into five parts. In the next section, a brief portrait of the
movement is developed. Following that, the two exemplary situations in
which the movement has exerted influence on the National Assembly are
discussed. Thereafter, in the two sections that follow, the factors that have
either facilitated or inhibited the capacity of the movement to exert such
influence are successively analysed. The article ends with a short con-
clusion.
T H E C H A R A C T E R O F T H E L A B O U R- L E D M O V E M E N T
Before attempting to map the nature, and explain the significance, of the
influence that the movement has had on legislative work in Nigeria, it is
important to offer – if only in outline – a working portrait of that move-
ment itself. The conceptual apparatus (and therefore character) of this
movement of both unionised and non-unionised social groups can be
understood as composed of three essential elements. The first is its highly
popular principal focus during the relevant years on the anti-fuel price
hike struggle. Given the centrality of fuel prices as a key economic factor in
Nigeria, and the highly negative (indeed harsh) impact it has almost always
had on the standards of living of the vast majority of Nigerians who are
relatively poor, the incessant and substantial increases during the period
under study of the price of this essential commodity could not but have
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elicited strong and sustained opposition from the Nigerian people and the
organisations and movements which have sought to represent their inter-
ests. Indeed, this movement has been front and centre in the struggle
against these harsh fuel price hikes. The second element of the conceptual
character of the movement is its concomitant ‘ socio-economic rights
movement’ character (NLC Constitution 1999: Article 3). By this is meant
the fact that its main focus during the relevant period on the anti-fuel price
hike struggle (a sustained effort at removing a key obstacle to the enjoy-
ment of a higher standard of living by most Nigerians) meant that the
movement basically devoted a corresponding bulk of its time and re-
sources to the effort to advance the socio-economic rights of ordinary
Nigerians.2 The third element of this movement’s conceptual apparatus is
the markedly pro-poor orientation of its struggles.3 As this much is implied
in the foregoing discussion, there is no need to dwell on this point. In
a similar vein, a defining characteristic of the movement has been its
demonstrated ability to craft and propagate messages that have resonated
with the vast majority of ordinary Nigerians (Turner & Brownhill
2004: 74).
The institutional/organisational character of both the movement and
its main component, the Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC), can be pieced
together by examining their composition, internal ordering, alliances/
coalitions, unity, geopolitical location, funding pattern, and main mode of
struggle. First, it should be noted that despite the fact that the NLC, the
main umbrella confederation of labour unions in Nigeria,4 is prominently
positioned at the core of the movement and constitutes the largest
single group within it, and although what is true of the NLC tends to be
true of the movement as well, the movement itself is composed of many
different elements – and not merely the formal sector workers unions
which constitute the NLC. These other groups are discussed later in this
section, after an examination of the origins of the NLC and the move-
ment.
Although the origins of labour unionism in Nigeria have been dated to
the 1940s (Lado 2000: 299), the NLC was founded only in 1978, when the
four separate central labour organisations that then existed in Nigeria
were unified under a single tent. It is currently composed of twenty-nine
labour unions (NLC Profile 2008: 1 ; Aina 1990: 39), and organised around
thirty-seven state councils and a number of central organs, the most im-
portant of which for our purposes is its National Executive Council (NEC)
(Informant 1 2004 int.). NEC is composed of the presidents and secretaries
of all of its affiliated unions, all the elected national officers of the NLC, its
key appointed national administrators, and the chairs and secretaries
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of the NLC’s thirty-seven councils. It is the NEC that tends to run the
movement’s mass action campaigns (Informant 1 2004 int.). The NLC
estimates the population of the workers who constitute its affiliate unions
at roughly 4 million, but given the relative decline in formal sector em-
ployment in Nigeria, the true figure is probably lower (Informant 1 2004
int.). In the same vein, although the specific labour-led movement that is
of concern here emerged in the post-1999 era, its pedigree is definitely
much older, dating back to at least the mid 1980s (Onyeonoru &
Aborisade 2001 : 43–66). Another important element of the organisational
character of the NLC is its national spread. It operates functioning offices
in all the states of the federation and Abuja, and its top leadership has
tended to be composed of a mix of both northerners and southerners
(Informant 1 2004 int.). This pan-Nigerian quality has also rubbed off
on the broader movement. As importantly, the NLC is basically a self-
funded organisation (Okafor, in prep.). It is principally funded through the
automatic remittance to its coffers of 10% of the membership fees col-
lected by each of its affiliate unions. This has meant that the anti-fuel price
hike movement that it led has also been financially self-sufficient.
A large number of informal sector workers (such as butchers, market
women, and motorbike taxi or ‘Okada’ riders), many opposition politi-
cians (such as the then Governor of Lagos State), student groups (such as
the progressive factions of the National Association of Nigerian Students
or NANS), self-described human rights NGOs (such as the Civil Liberties
Organisation), and some religious elements (such as some Catholic
Bishops), allied with the NLC to form and run the movement (Daily
Champion 2005; PM News 2004). Thus, to be sure, the movement was
substantially grassroots-based and popular (Abimbola 2002: 43–4). Yet the
more marginal (though not of course entirely absent) contribution during
this specific era of a far more factionalised, much more badly led, and
therefore generally weaker, NANS suggests the existence of a significant
chink in the movement’s grassroots armour. Space restrictions do not,
however, allow further adumbration of this point here.
The reins of leadership of the movement were firmly in the hands of the
NLC (e.g. Daily Champion 2005). It was the NLC that, in almost all cases,
conceived of and led the struggles (general strikes/mass demonstrations/
economic disruptions and other forms of mass action) that the movement
waged over the relevant period. This fact is worth noting here mainly
because in the past the NLC’s effectiveness as the leader of such struggles
has ebbed and flowed with time. For example, its rather marginal contri-
bution to the struggle for social change in Nigeria in the difficult period
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around 1993/94 is now well established (Onyeonoru & Aborisade 2001 :
43–66).
It is also crucial to note that the movement’s tendency to principally
deploy and chiefly rely on the mass mobilisation/mass action mode of
struggle is one of its defining characteristics (PM News 2004). And the
nature, variety and scale of these mass actions are easily illustrated by
reference to two of the most important mass actions that were prosecuted
by the movement during the period under study. In the first example,
in response to the first increase of fuel prices announced by the then
new Obasanjo government in June 2000, the NLC led one of the most
crippling and effective general strikes since the end of military rule in
Nigeria (Okafor 2007: 80–5). Some oil workers joined public sector and
transport workers in ensuring the success of the strike (WDM 2005;
Okafor 2007: 80–5). Nigeria’s main seaport in Lagos and many major
highways were blockaded; international and domestic air flights were
disrupted, and almost all fuel stations were closed. Sporadic police and
protester violence was reported across the country and at least two police
stations in the federal capital territory, Abuja, were burned down by irate
mobs. In contrast, in September 2005, the NLC announced a sustained
mass action campaign initially consisting of two weeks of massive but far
more peaceful demonstrations and rallies across Nigeria (BBC 2005b).
These protests/rallies were massively attended. In Lagos, for example, a
mammoth crowd was mobilised that, at a point, stretched for nearly 3 km.
Any reasonable estimate of the size of this crowd – one of many such street
protests/rallies across the country – would put it, at a minimum, in the
tens (if not hundreds) of thousands. The BBC (2005b) put the figure at
‘ thousands ’. Apart from NLC officials such as then President Adams
Oshiomole, the Catholic archbishop of Lagos Olubunmi Okogie, Nobel
Prize winner Professor Wole Soyinka, and Governor Bola Tinubu of
Lagos state all addressed this rally (ibid.). A threatened general strike/mass
action that was due to be prosecuted in November 2004 was called off by
the NLC and its allies in the movement because, before it could begin
fully, the government averted it by retreating in significant measure from
the planned price hikes (BBC 2005c).
Implicit to an extent in this exposé of the character of the movement’s
mass actions is the fact that, although almost all of the pressure tactics that
it deployed can justifiably be described as mass actions, they have also
varied somewhat in their exact features. They have included (usually in
the course of the very same confrontation with the government) ‘ strike-
centred’ mass actions, significant threats of such actions, stand-alone de-
monstrations, and disruptions of economic life. The notable exception is
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the September 2005 mass demonstrations, which were – as a result of a
contrarian court order – not accompanied by a general strike component
(Okafor 2007: 80–5).
Overall, given the principal focus of the movement on its anti-fuel price
hike struggle, the pro-poor character of its sustained labours, its grassroots
composition, its popularly run, funded and controlled character, its mass
mobilisation/action mode of struggle, and the way in which it has res-
onated with vast numbers of average Nigerians, it seems altogether reason-
able to characterise it as a mass social movement.
I N F L U E N C E O N L E G I S L A T I V E R E A S O N I N G, P R O C E S S A N D A C T I O N
As a result mostly of the movement’s dogged struggles during the relevant
period, legislative work has tended to attain correspondence and reach
accordance, much more than would ordinarily have been the case, both
with the movement’s ‘ logics of appropriateness ’ (Finnemore & Sikkink
1998: 887) and anti-fuel price hike demands, and with the similarly
negative reactions of most ordinary Nigerians to the very vexed and highly
consequential fuel price hikes question. Illustrative examples of such in-
fluence are discussed in the following sub-sections.
Influence on legislative responses to the labour-led movement’s anti-fuel
price hike struggles
Mediating between the labour-led movement and the Executive Branch
In response to the mass action-centred struggles that the movement waged
against fuel price hikes, both chambers of the National Assembly regularly
mediated between the office of the President of Nigeria and the move-
ment. An opposition member of the House of Representatives (HoR),
UsmanMohammed, well described the mediatory functions performed by
the HoR in this context, and the influence that the movement has had on
the HoR, when he noted that ‘ to avoid [the October 2004] strike … the
issue required the lawmakers to quietly negotiate the people out of
the problem by linking up with the executive branch of government, the
labour union[s] and the [fuel] marketers ’ (Nwaigwe 2004). That such
mediation was actually undertaken by the National Assembly is easily
illustrated. For example, in his report to the membership of his organis-
ation about the 2003 anti-fuel price hike struggle, then NLC president
Adams Oshiomole acknowledged the mediatory role played by both the
senior leadership and some members of the National Assembly.
Oshiomole was able to report that the then Speaker of the HoR, Aminu
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Bello Masari, who had taken on such a role, ‘ informed the Congress [i.e.
the NLC] leadership that at the [HoR’s] consultation with President
Obasanjo two days earlier [i.e. on 30 June 2003], the President had told him
that the figure of sign for 40 naira was not constant [i.e. that this figure
could be reduced as demanded by the labour-led movement] ’ (NLC 2003).
The leaders and members of both legislative houses undertook this
mediatory function mainly because they recognised the considerable in-
fluence that the movement had on the very group of Nigerians on whom
(all said and done, and notwithstanding the tendency of too many politi-
cians to rig elections) they, i.e. the legislators, still depended – to some
degree – for their legitimacy. It was clear, therefore, that the movement
was able to persuade and/or pressure the National Assembly to take it
seriously enough to spend some time performing this important mediatory
role.
Lobbying the labour-led movement to come to a compromise
A good indication of the respect and seriousness with which the relevant
legislative houses treated the movement (mainly in recognition of the mass
support that it enjoyed), and of the influence that the movement wielded
within the National Assembly as a result, is the fact that – as an extension
of the mediatory role they played in Executive Branch/movement fuel
price hike confrontations – the legislature almost always resorted to lob-
bying the movement (via the NLC) to come to some kind of compromise
with the Executive Branch. For example, in an effort to prevent the
widespread and generally effective mass action undertaken by the move-
ment between late June and early July 2003, a large delegation of the then
HoR led by Speaker Masari, the fourth highest ranking official in Nigeria,
‘ sought urgent audience with the Congress [i.e. NLC] leadership at the
Congress headquarters where it passionately pleaded with the Congress
not to go on strike, promising [in return] to exact a concession from the
presidency’ (NLC 2003). In other words, the number four official in the
country came to the movement to ask for a concession, and not the other
way round. Understandably touched by this gesture (especially in a cul-
tural context in which such hierarchies tend to be accentuated), the leaders
of the NLC noted, most accurately, that ‘ the Speaker [and indeed the
HoR] had demonstrated unusual respect for the Congress ’ (NLC 2003).
Another example is the fact that in the midst of this same mass action, and
at the instance of then Senate President, Adolphus Wabara, the Senate
leadership met with the leaders of the NLC and mostly lobbied them
(without success) to call off the mass action and give them some time to
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resolve the impasse between them and the Executive Branch (NLC 2003;
The Vanguard 2003). Even more telling is the fact that the same Senate
President and Speaker later went uninvited to an emergency meeting of
the Central Working Committee (CWC) of the NLC, and while there
lobbied the entire CWC to call off their mass action (NLC 2003). Here
again, the influence of the movement is palpable. These were very high
public officials with serious day-to-day work to do and their own electoral
fortunes to cater to, who would not have devoted the considerable amount
of time they did to lobbying the movement had they not thought that it
was an important and meaningful effort to make.
Orienting legislative process in positive response to the movement’s struggles
Over the eight or so years covered by this study, the movement’s anti-fuel
price hike struggles have often functioned as one critical factor that led the
Senate and/or the HoR to modify its legislative agenda or schedule, or to
initiate or orient internal processes, so as to correspond or accord more
with the positions taken and demands made by the movement. This point
is easily illustrated. For example, in July 2003, mostly owing to the pre-
vailing public sentiment and the demands of the movement, the Senate
and the HOR each established their own separate legislative inquiries to
investigative the shootings of protesters that were allegedly carried out by
the police in order to repress the June/July 2003 anti-fuel price hike mass
action undertaken by the movement (NLC 2003; HRW 2003: 11–12). The
relevant Senate Committee held public hearings around the country, and
published findings that tended to vindicate the NLC’s allegations and
demand that the inquiries be set up in the first place (NLC 2003). The
relevant HoR committee also held hearings on the same matter, albeit in
private (NLC 2003). This amounted in each case to a significant devotion
of legislative resources and time to the matter. And the decision to conduct
the inquiries and to spend as much time as the respective committees did
on them was in very large measure driven by the expressed outrage of the
vast majority of Nigerians on this subject – outrage that was to a great
extent mobilised, generated, articulated and accentuated because of the
determined and sustained efforts of the labour-led movement. Similarly,
following the government/movement face-off over the October 2004 fuel
price hike, the HoR formed an ad hoc committee to help resolve the
matter (HoR 2004: 2).
Another way in which legislative houses in Nigeria have oriented some
of their internal processes in response to the movement’s struggles is the
passage of legislative motions. One such motion was passed by the HoR
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under the head ‘matters of national importance’, ‘ in response to the
general uproar of disaffection that greeted the [fuel price] increases ’ of
June 2003 (NLC 2003). This motion could not have been passed without
the HoR orienting its regular deliberative procedures to prioritise and
devote much time to this issue, and treat seriously the threat of mass action
that the movement had issued at that time. The movement’s influence was
at play because the motion was passed and the process oriented in the
particular way it was, because of the uproar that greeted the fuel price
increases. Needless to say, that uproar was itself created in part, and ac-
centuated in large measure, as a result of the sustained efforts of the
movement.
Likewise, the Senate has on more than one occasion altered or modified
its agenda and schedule so as to deal with a threat or actual implemen-
tation of an anti-fuel price hike mass action by the movement. For in-
stance, in response to one such threat in June 2007, Senate President
David Mark declared at a press conference that ‘we [Senators] are actu-
ally on recess now, but we are going to have to resume as quickly as
possible, so that we can also participate in trying to appease Nigerians ’
(The Vanguard 2007).
Opposing the Executive Branch’s fuel price hikes
A key indicator of the considerable measure of influence exerted by the
movement on legislative work in Nigeria is the extent to which various
contingents of lawmakers, each of which can – at the very least – be de-
scribed as very large, openly condemned almost every fuel price hike
mandated by the Executive Branch. In some cases, a majority of either the
Senate or the HoR supported the movement’s position and expressed in
solemn legislative form their opposition to the rise in fuel prices. Clearly
therefore, the logic developed and articulated on behalf of most Nigerians
by that movement, regarding the inappropriateness of the fuel price hikes,
resonated strongly within the National Assembly.
What is more, it is remarkable indeed that even many federal law-
makers who belonged to the governing People’s Democratic Party (PDP),
the same party as President Obasanjo, and who formed a very large ma-
jority in both houses of the National Assembly, at one time or the other,
expressed a measure of opposition of the Executive Branch’s fuel price
hikes. A couple of representative examples from each of the two chambers
of the National Assembly demonstrate this point. Expressing a weaker
form of opposition to the October 2004 round of fuel price hikes (ruling
party member) Senator T. Wada, then Chair of the Senate Committee on
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information, ‘vowed that [if the increase is the handiwork of profiteering
marketers] the Senate would give the development immediate con-
sideration on resumption from [their] oversight break and direct a re-
versal through resolutions and orders appropriate to salvage the solution’
(Nwaigwe 2004). Expressing his view more strongly, Honorable Ike
Chinwo, another PDP lawmaker, saw these same fuel price hikes as
‘completely condemnable’ (ibid.).
As importantly, in response to the October 2003 fuel price hike, and the
threat by the labour-led movement to launch a mass action against it, the
HoR (dominated as it is by lawmakers from the governing party) debated
the matter and passed a strongly worded Resolution denouncing the price
increase and urging that, as it was ‘concerned that the NLC has given
notice of strike [i.e. mass action] unless the price [of fuel] is reversed’, fuel
prices in the country should be ‘reversed to status quo ante ’ (NAD 2003a:
1064). The HoR also described the impugned fuel price increases as ‘ il-
legal ’ and ‘unconstitutional ’, and even went as far as condemning those
state governors who helped negotiate such price increases (ibid. : 1064–5).
Prior to its passage, a draft form of this Resolution was presented to the
president in person by a high delegation composed of all but one member
of the leadership of the House, underlining the Resolution’s importance in
the eyes of the HoR (NAD 2003a: 1037).5
The HoR behaved similarly in response to the October 2004 fuel price
increase and the movement’s strike threat. On that occasion, it passed a
Resolution calling on ‘ the Executive Arm of Government and all related
agencies to revert to the old prices of all refined products ’, and urged
‘Labour to suspend the impending strike/mass protest ’ (HoR 2004: 2).
For its part, the relevant Senate Committee (2004b) held hearings on this
round of fuel price hikes, and recommended that the Executive Arm
should roll back fuel prices to their previous levels ‘ in order to ameliorate
the hardship on ordinary Nigerians’. At the very least, both resolutions
reflected the positions held by the movement.
The fact that many lawmakers expressed anger over a court ruling in
2005 that purported to bar the NLC from calling out Nigerians on ‘gen-
eral strikes ’ only strengthens the argument (Nwaigwe 2004). Indeed, many
of these legislators explicitly ‘construed this development as a confir-
mation of the war by the executive against the NLC over the pricing of
petroleum products ’ (ibid.).
It may of course be argued that, as elected politicians who must be
sensitive to the widespread unpopularity of the impugned fuel price hikes,
legislators could have come to the decisions they reached on their own,
with little if any influence from the movement. Understandable as this
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argument may seem, it is nevertheless mistaken. For one, as there is
widespread consensus both within and outside Nigeria that the elections
conducted in the country during the relevant period were all-too-often
largely (though not completely) rigged, it cannot be simply assumed that
these legislators were in all cases as sensitive to the popular mood as should
be the case. Although the deep cleavages between Nigerian society, its
highly independent press, and its long and peculiar tradition of broadly
and mostly consensual politics (even under military rule), have meant that
Nigerian politicians must still pay significant heed to the ebb and flow
of popular opinion, for the popular will to prevail over a legislator’s self-
interest (especially in view of the contradictory posture of a dominant
presidency), the outcry against the impugned government conduct must
be very loud, sustained, unified, intense, and consequential enough for
these legislators to pay the kind of heed to it that they repeatedly did in
the wake of the anti-fuel price hike struggles waged by the movement. The
movement was the megaphone and concentrator that transformed the
oppositional voices of ordinary Nigerians into such an outcry that legis-
lators felt obliged to take notice.
Influence on the Trade Union (Amendment) Act 2005
The nature of the government’s original bill
As noted in the Report of the relevant Senate Committee (2004a), on 8
June 2004 then President Olusegun Obasanjo sent a bill to the National
Assembly which sought to amend certain sections of Nigeria’s Trade
Union Act of 1990 (hereafter TU Amendment Bill 2004). This bill con-
tained a number of provisions that generated much controversy both
within and without the National Assembly. Among other things, Section 3
sought to amend Section 16A of the Trade Union Act of 1990 (hereafter
referred to as ‘ the principal act ’) in a way that would in effect have banned
or frustrated strikes altogether, by providing that employers who deduct
union dues from the wages of its unionised workers may only remit those
sums to the relevant union if that union had agreed to a so-called ‘no-
strike clause ’ in its collective agreement with the employer. The relevant
portion of the new Section 16A read as follows:
16A. Upon the registration and recognition of any of the trade unions specified in
the Third Schedule to this Act, an Employer may – …
(b) Pay any sum so deducted directly to the registered office of the trade union,
provided that compliance with the provisions of this section of this Act shall
be subject to the insertion of ‘A No Strike ’ clause in the relevant Collective
Bargaining Agreements between the workers and their employers.
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Secondly, the bill also provided that a two-thirds majority of union
members must vote in favour of a strike before a union could declare a
strike (ibid. : Section 5). Again, for the avoidance of doubt, the amended
Section 30 of the principal act would have included a new clause which
would have read as follows: ‘ (6) No trade union or registered federation of
trade unions, by whatever name called shall embark on a strike action
unless upon a resolution passed by at least two thirds majority of the
members of the trade union or registered federation of trade unions, as the
case may be, approving the strike action. ’ It is noteworthy here that
the two-thirds majority is not limited by requiring only the consent of
two thirds of those ‘present and voting’, and as such must be taken to refer
to two thirds of all the members of the union or federation of unions – a
much more onerous majority to attain.
Thirdly, the bill sought to introduce an amendment to end the status of
the NLC as the only official central labour union in Nigeria. Section 6 of
the bill would have mandated the Registrar of Trade Unions to ‘remove
from the register the Nigeria Labour Congress as the only Central Labour
Organisation in Nigeria ’. This provision of the bill would supposedly
democratise labour unionism in Nigeria.
And lastly, among its key provisions, Section 5 of the bill proposed to
introduce a new Section 30(1A), which would have conferred discretionary
power on the Minister of Labour to approve the formation of federations
of trade unions. In other words, the Minister could refuse to register a
federation formed by a group of unions. Read in combination with the
proposed mandate under the bill that the Registrar remove the NLC from
the register (meaning it had to re-apply for status as one of the new fed-
erations of trade unions), this provision was sure to raise much contro-
versy.
While the Executive Branch and its supporters variously claimed that
this bill was intended to ‘entrench sanity and decent behaviour in the
manner in which strikes are conducted’ (This Day 2005), or that it was
introduced ‘ in the same spirit of strengthening our democratic insti-
tution[s] ’ (NAD 2004a: 0578), many others have not been as generous in
their assessment. As recorded in the reports of such disparate bodies as
the Senate Committee on Employment, Labour and Productivity, and the
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), the widespread sense among
observers of the Nigerian political scene was that the bill was designed and
introduced with the principal objective of curtailing the impressive power of
the movement’s main driving force (the NLC) (Senate Committee 2004a:
1 ; BBC 2005a). Given the nature of the contents of the bill (and the Act that
was passed as a result), the movement’s largely contentious relationship
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with the Obasanjo government (Dawodu.com 2003), the unusual speed
with which the bill was passed into law (NAD 2004b: 0853), the timing of
the bill’s introduction into the National Assembly, and the Executive
Arm’s tenacity regarding its de-regulation drive in the petroleum sector
(read significant fuel price hikes) (Dawodu.com 2003), there is much to be
said in favour of a more sceptical reading of the government’s motives in
introducing the bill.
The labour-led movement’s resistance campaign against the bill
In any case, whatever the Executive Branch’s true motivations were, the
movement was so convinced that the bill was intended to weaken it
and thereby curtail its ability to effectively challenge the Executive’s in-
cessant fuel price hikes, that it mounted a strong resistance campaign
against many key (though not all) provisions of the bill. This strong
resistance to the bill took various forms. One of these was a media
campaign that it launched in a bid to garner public support to its side,
and to thus gain some leverage over both the National Assembly and
the Executive Branch. Semi-authoritarian though its behaviour tended
to be, the Obasanjo-led Executive Branch was not impervious to poli-
tical pressure of the loudly expressed, widespread and intense kind
(NLC 2004a; Informant 1 2004 int.). And as contentious as their claims
to have won elections to the National Assembly were, federal legis-
lators were also hardly immune to persuasion or pressure. The move-
ment’s media campaign was so effective that the Report of the Senate
Committee which studied the bill acknowledged the ‘major outcry’ that
its introduction had produced across the country (Senate Committee
2004a: 1).
In line with its media campaign strategy, representatives of the move-
ment made a number of anti-bill presentations and sent submissions to
both houses of the National Assembly. In these presentations and sub-
missions they, inter alia, argued against all of the aspects of the bill that have
been discussed above and called on the National Assembly to expunge
those clauses from the proposed legislation (Senate Committee 2004a:
4–5; NLC 2004c; Informant 9 2005 int.). The tenacity with which they
pursued this particular strategy is evidenced by the fact that the NLC still
sent a submission to the Speaker of the HoR even after both houses of the
National Assembly had passed separate versions of the bill, and produced
a harmonised version for final enactment (NLC 2004c). As might be ex-
pected, in conjunction with all of the above measures, the movement also
lobbied the leaders and other members of the National Assembly to reject
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the aspects of the proposed legislation that it found offensive (Informants
1, 5 & 6 2004 interviews).
Lastly, although the movement did not exercise the option of launching
a mass protest specifically aimed at pressuring and/or persuading the
Executive Branch and the National Assembly to refrain from enacting the
impugned provisions of the bill into law, given the many successful mass
protests that had been launched by the NLC during the same period, and
aware as they clearly were of the movement’s considerable success
at garnering the bulk of public opinion to its side, the threat of such a
mass action must have been all too real to the members of the National
Assembly. What is more, as has been argued above, the movement did
launch a successful media-based mass mobilisation effort, and competed for
and won the hearts and minds of the vast majority of the Nigerian people
(Senate Committee 2004a: 1). Indeed, as a prominent opposition senator,
Olorunnimbe Mamora, noted in a speech on the floor of the Senate, by
the time the bill came up for debate in the National Assembly, a credible
opinion poll suggested that the vast majority of Nigerians (over 85%) had
been persuaded to side with the movement in their opposition to key
aspects of the bill (NAD 2004a: 0587). Given the National Assembly’s
amenability to strong public pressure, this widespread discontent with the
bill, evidenced by much more than this one poll, could only have affected
positively the decisions taken by the Assembly to modify the bill into much
less draconian form.
The nature of the final legislation as enacted
The act of the National Assembly that was passed as a result of the bill, i.e.
the new Trade Union (Amendment) Act 2005, amends the principal act
and allied legislation (see TU Act 1990; TU Decree 1996a; TU Decree
1996b). Differing initial versions of this act were passed by the Senate on 9
September 2004 and by the HoR on 16 December 2004 (NAD 2004b:
0856, 2004d: 0765). A harmonised version of the bill, produced by a
conference committee made up of representatives of both chambers of
the National Assembly, was passed by the HoR on 9 March 2005 and
the Senate on 15 March 2005 (see TU Amendment Act 2005). It was
assented to by the president on 30 March 2005, and came into effect that
same day.
The main changes wrought by the new act were to limit the scope of
the subject matter or issues over which labour unions and the NLC (or
some other ‘central labour organisation’) can call a strike. It did so by
distinguishing in Section 6 (which introduced a modified Section 30 of
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the principal act) between what it termed a ‘dispute of right ’ (that is
one arising directly from a collective agreement) and what others may
style a ‘dispute of interest ’ (see TU Amendment Act 2005, Section 6).
A dispute of right is defined in the new Section 30(9) of the principal act
as ‘any labour dispute arising from the negotiation, application, in-
terpretation or implementation of a contract of employment or collective
agreement under this act or any other enactment or law governing
matters relating to terms and conditions of employment. ’ As such, strikes
against fuel price hikes, one of the main sources of government/move-
ment friction in Nigeria during the 1999–2007 period, are presumably
now outlawed under the new act. In practice, however, the movement
has not tended to interpret the new Act in this way, and has undertaken
at least one mass action (with a general strike at its core) since it was
enacted.
In addition, the new Act introduced a new Section 30(6)(a) into the
principal Act, which effectively bars strikes in so-called essential services.6
It does so by requiring that ‘no person, trade union or employer shall take
part in a strike or lockout or engage in any conduct in contemplation or
furtherance of a strike or lockout ’ if that person, union or employer is
‘engaged in the provision of essential services ’. The term ‘essential ser-
vices ’ is defined in the Trade Disputes Act (1990: First Schedule).
Third, the new Act sets somewhat more stringent preconditions for
strikes. While it eschews the much harsher two-third majority rule and
‘no-strike clauses ’ desired by the government, it still requires that unless a
simple majority of all union members vote in favour, no union leadership
or leadership organ can declare a legal strike action. In the past, the
elected national organs of labour unions or the NLC could declare and
undertake strikes and other such actions. In any case, as confirmed by its
official report of the debate on the bill, the Senate, fully conscious of the
implications of its decision, explicitly agreed to enact a pre-strike re-
quirement of a simple majority of all union members (NAD 2004b: 0851).
This is a significantly more onerous precondition than a mere simple
majority of those present and voting.
Fourth, while the new Act eschews the deregistration of the NLC in any
form, it allows for the creation of other central labour organisations apart
from the NLC. Sections 7, 8 and (to a much lesser extent) other clauses of
the new Act modified the principal Act so as to allow the termination of
the NLC’s status as the exclusive central organisation or confederation
of trade unions in Nigeria, and allow for the registration of as many other
entities (referred to in the new Act as ‘ federations of trade unions’) as the
relevant unions decide to form. While this measure could potentially
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threaten and diminish the unity that generally exists at present within the
labour union community in Nigeria, and thus diminish their effectiveness
as a community (a motive that was credibly ascribed by the NLC and
others to the Obasanjo regime), as the movement itself acknowledges, it
is not undemocratic in itself to allow for multiple legal centres (NLC
2004b: 8).
And fifth, the new Act bars the picketing of airports or public highways
to obstruct air or motor vehicular traffic. Section 9 of the new act amends
the old Section 42 of the principal act by inserting a new sub-section
42(1B), which explicitly bars any person or union from engaging in a strike
which may ‘prevent aircraft from flying or obstruct public highways, in-
stitutions or premises of any kind for the purposes of giving effect to the
strike ’. Damaging as it is to the NLC’s ability to leverage a complete shut
down of the economy in its campaigns against the government, this pro-
vision is not altogether unreasonable.
In conclusion, as the new Act differs in a number of significant respects
from the original bill introduced into the National Assembly, it is im-
portant to map and analyse as clearly and precisely as possible the impact
that the efforts of the movement to resist aspects of the bill had on the
content of the final act.
The impact of the labour-led movement on the content and tone of the final legislation
The movement exerted considerable, if limited, influence on the content
and overall tone of the new Act. Under great pressure from the movement
(Senate Committee 2004a: 1), the National Assembly modified and toned
down quite significantly the original bill’s much harsher proposals. The
three major but highly consequential amendments that the National
Assembly made to the original bill were as follows: it expunged the
Executive Arm’s proposal to ban strikes altogether ; it reduced the number
of votes required for a union to declare a strike from a two-thirds to a
simple majority ; and it expunged the mandate that the bill would have
imposed on the Registrar of Trade Unions to deregister the NLC as the
only central labour organisation in Nigeria (Okafor 2007: 85).
With regard to the government’s original proposal to outlaw strikes, this
was roundly rejected both by the Senate Committee that studied the
original bill and by the full Senate itself (Senate Committee 2004a: 7 ;
NAD 2004b: 0849). In rejecting it, the Committee noted that ‘ there is no
need for a no-strike clause’ in the collective agreements that unions sign
with employers (Senate Committee 2004a: 7). This provision was also
rejected by the HoR (NAD 2004d: 0737–43). In articulating the basis for
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the similar rejection of this provision by the HoR, Honourable Uche
Onyeagocha declared:
Mr. Chairman, I am strongly arguing against that because the inclusion of the no
strike clause in that sub-section is completely a violation of the Constitution, which
allows for the freedom of expression and it would be wrong for us to allow for the
inclusion of a clause which is a violation of the Constitution already. So I propose
that the insertion of the ‘‘no strike clause ’’ be removed.
The rejection of this clause by the National Assembly had much to do with
the explicit and intense campaign launched by the movement against its
inclusion in the original bill. For instance, in their submissions to the
Senate Committee, the NLC and its allies in the movement explicitly
urged the Senate to preserve the right to strike (Senate Committee 2004a:
5). This is exactly what the Senate did. But did the Senate do what it did
because of the labour-led movement’s pressure and/or persuasion? While it
is difficult to map a direct chain of causation that leads from the move-
ment’s struggles to the National Assembly’s decision, the struggle of the
movement to retain its legal strike powers was definitely one critical (even
pivotal) factor that shaped that decision. For, acting as it did against the
wishes of a dominant Obasanjo presidency, to which external pressure
point other than the movement could the National Assembly have been
responding? While the personal convictions and political interests of many
parliamentarians (some of whom were known human rights activists and
opposition figures) did of course play some role in the National Assembly’s
decision-making process, it is clear that the intense external stimulus pro-
vided by a largely pro-movement Nigerian public was a critical factor in
shaping the National Assembly’s decision. There is in addition explicit
evidence for this conclusion. Henry Ugbolue, then spokesperson of the
Senate, put it beyond reasonable doubt when he declared publicly that
‘ the Senate is yielding to the demand of labour by amending certain
original demands made by the president ’ (BBC 2004).
With regard to theNational Assembly’s reduction of themajority needed
to declare a strike from a two-thirds super majority to a simple majority,
the NLC and its allies in the movement had made arguments to the
National Assembly suggesting that this requirement should be expunged
as being, at the very least, inappropriate and impractical (Senate Com-
mittee 2004a: 5). The Senate Committee recommended that the Senate
expunge the ‘ two-third majority rule ’ and replace it with ‘majority rule ’
(ibid., Annexure 2: 6). The full Senate accepted this recommendation in
principle, and clarified the majority rule requirement to mean a ‘simple
majority ’ of all the registered members of the relevant union or federation
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of trade unions (NAD 2004b: 0850). In response to a question from a re-
sistant ruling-party Senator, the Senate Leader confirmed this interpret-
ation (ibid. : 0851). And this view prevailed in the voting that ensued. Here,
as disempowering to the movement as the agreed and enacted rule is, the
significance of the impact that the movement’s struggle against this pro-
vision had on the reasoning and action of the National Assembly is denoted
by the fact that the rule was even toned down at all. What it more, it is far
easier to attain a simple majority than to garner a two-third positive vote.
As is evident from the discussion in the last paragraph, the significant
alteration to the original bill that occurred in the current connection was
owed in large measure to the effective resistance campaign mounted by
the movement (BBC 2004). Given the explicit acknowledgement of this
fact by the then spokesperson of the National Assembly, very little room
remains for doubt.
Concerning the National Assembly’s rejection of the mandate which
would have been imposed on the Registrar of Trade Unions to deregister
the NLC as the only central labour organisation in Nigeria, the NLC and
its allies in the movement had made arguments to the National Assembly
which suggested that ‘ the removal of the NLC from the register would
amount to [the] proscription of the organisation’ and that ‘ it was not
necessary to remove the NLC from the register in order to register
and recognise other central labour organisations ’ (Senate Committee
2004a: 4). The National Assembly followed the course of action implied
by this argument, and authorised the recognition of other central labour
organisations without the removal of the NLC from the register (e.g. ibid. :
8 ; NAD 2004b: 0849). Indeed, Bassey Ewa Henshaw, Chair of the rel-
evant senate committee, left no room for speculation about this point
when he noted in presenting his committee’s report to the full Senate that
‘ the implication is that the Nigeria Labour Congress, which is presently
the central labour organisation, does not have to die ’ (NAD 2004a: 0581).
Here again, it is quite clear that, in amending the relevant sections of the
original bill in the stated way, the National Assembly was largely (though
not entirely) responding to the efforts of the movement to persuade and/or
pressure it in that direction.
But, as we have seen already, the movement’s campaign against key
aspects of the original bill did not in each and every case influence or
adequately impact the content of the final Act. For example, strikes against
fuel price hikes are presumably now formally outlawed under the new Act
(TU Amendment Act 2005: Section 6). Also, ‘essential workers ’ are bar-
red from ever declaring a strike (ibid.). Again, no union can declare a strike
unless a simple majority of all union members vote in favour (ibid.). The
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movement actively campaigned against virtually all of these aspects of the
proposed legislation, but obviously failed in its effort to get the National
Assembly to reject them.
On the whole, it is important to understand that despite these few fail-
ures to get the National Assembly to toe its line, the extent and significance
of the influence which the movement exerted on the content and tone of
the Act that finally emerged from the original bill can only be described as
considerable and impressive. The movement could scarcely have been
able to achieve this had its more general anti-fuel price struggle, repu-
tation for dogged resistance, and mass appeal, not impressed and impac-
ted the National Assembly in a significant way. As an important labour
activist correctly put it, ‘our influence … led to it [the Bill] being toned
down’ (Informant 10 2005 int.).
The high significance of the movement’s accomplishments in this regard
becomes even more palpable when the tenacity of the Obasanjo govern-
ment’s resolve to pursue the neo-liberal reform agenda that the movement
so strongly opposed (one which led to that government’s strident efforts to
weaken it) is introduced into the picture. In a telling 2003 broadcast to
Nigerians, President Obasanjo had angrily expressed ‘deep concern over
the conduct of the Nigeria Labour Congress ’ in strongly opposing his
government’s petroleum deregulation measures, and had forcefully in-
dicated his ‘Government’s resolve to ensure that the ongoing reformagenda
remains on course’ (Dawodu.com 2003). Thus, the remarkable fact is that
the movement enjoyed the afore-discussed successes in a context in which a
palpably strong (even semi-authoritarian) executive branch was deter-
mined to weaken a popularly backedmovement’s ability to obstruct or slow
down a reform agenda to which the government was strongly committed.
However, the tenor of the discussion in this section of the article leads
inexorably to two questions that get at the reasons for the limited nature of
the admittedly considerable impact of the movement’s resistance cam-
paign in both connections. What factors facilitated the movement’s in-
fluence on legislative work? And what factors militated against the
movement’s ability to enjoy more success? These two separate, if related,
questions are tackled in the next two sections, albeit only in outline.
F A C T O R S T H A T F A C I L I T A T E D T H E L A B O U R- L E D M O V E M E N T’ S
I N F L U E N C E
Viewed in the context of the two examples of themovement’s influence that
have been discussed, the main factors that facilitated the movement’s im-
pact on legislative work in Nigeria from 1999 to 2007 include the following.
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First, the fact that the semi-democratic character of the Obasanjo re-
gime and the deep diversity of the Nigerian body politic still allowed
some space for oppositional politics was an important factor that aided
the movement’s ability to influence the National Assembly. Yet it took a
strong and skilled NLC leadership to take the movement from the rela-
tively troubled state in which it languished by the end of the infamous
Abacha military regime in 1998, and elevate it to the comparatively diz-
zying heights it eventually attained. Clearly, the quality of their leaders
has, over time, been an important factor that has shaped the performance
of such movements in Nigeria (Abimbola 2002: 43–4). What is more, the
well-known fact that the NLC had enjoyed a long socio-political career as
an organisation and had accumulated a very long experience of action for
social change contributed to its effectiveness (Turner & Brownhill 2004:
79). Another facilitative factor was the movement’s broad organisational
unity in struggle, especially its strategy of coalescing around an NLC
core – a factor that was well recognised by the government (Senate
Committee 2004a: 4).
As importantly, the prevalent social context of mass poverty and the
popular resentment that it has bred meant that the vast majority of
Nigerians were ‘ripe for mobilisation’. The movement’s implicit pro-poor
and pro–socio-economic rights message resonated deeply among the
ranks of ordinary Nigerians. As such, most Nigerians also identified with
the movement’s struggle to protect itself against the Executive Branch’s
efforts to weaken it (see BBC 2000; The Vanguard 2005). This, in turn, put
much pressure on the National Assembly.
For the most part, the widespread support enjoyed by the movement
and its consequent legislative influence could not have been produced
in as significant a measure were it not for the fact that it tended to func-
tion in a mass social movement mode (as defined earlier). This is now
well recognised in the literature (e.g. Olowu 2006: 144). The fact that
the movement operated in this mode allowed it to reduce the social
distance that might have existed between it and most Nigerians ; find
and focus on messages that deeply resonated with the average Nigerian;
and mobilise so many of them that both the National Assembly and
the Executive Arm were, to some extent, forced to heed its message.
Recognising the reality of the movement’s mass social movement charac-
ter, President Obasanjo even went as far as to pillory the NLC for its ef-
forts to ‘mobilise all Nigerians ’ (Dawodu.com 2003). As the person
who wears the shoe knows where it pinches, Obasanjo was clearly point-
ing at the characteristic of the movement that stung his government the
most.
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F A C T O R S T H A T M I L I T A T E D A G A I N S T T H E L A B O U R- L E D
M O V E M E N T’ S I N F L U E N C E
Several factors militated against the movement’s greater success. First, the
ever increasing frustration within the Obasanjo presidency regarding the
movement’s use of its derived political leverage to obstruct the im-
plementation of the government’s reform agenda drove the presidency’s
behaviour. For example, Obasanjo declared in a national broadcast that
‘ it is noteworthy that every step taken to deregulate the downstream oil
sector has been dogged by, sometimes, irresponsible opposition by the
Labour Congress. The result has been that we took too little steps to
achieve no meaningful and satisfactory progress ’ (Dawodu.com 2003,
emphasis added). This frustration led to a determination within that re-
gime to act in various ways to curtail labour’s power to force the govern-
ment’s hand. This point requires little further adumbration here. Suffice it
to point to the testimony of the then Minister of Labour before the rel-
evant Senate Committee, in which he listed as one key reason for the
Executive Branch’s introduction of the bill into the National Assembly the
government’s perception that
the NLC sometimes became [sic] and tended to hold the entire country to ran-
som. Therefore the amendments [i.e. the Bill] sought were to create the oppor-
tunity for other central labour organisations to exist and to reduce the frequency
of strikes [i.e. anti-fuel price hike mass protests] and the attendant negative effects
on the nation.
Senate Committee 2004a: 4
The retention of the anti-Labour clauses that survived from the original
bill is traceable in part to the fact that many members of the National
Assembly shared this sense of frustration. Even the NLC leadership con-
ceded this point, perhaps in part because it was fairly clear to its leadership
that it could not win on this particular issue (ibid. : 4).
Another factor that militated against the optimisation of the move-
ment’s success in the relevant respects was the fact that the ruling party
also enjoyed an overwhelming majority in the National Assembly. Given
that almost all opposition legislators tended to take sides with the move-
ment, had the opposition parties held more seats in the National As-
sembly, the movement would probably have been even more successful
than it was in exerting influence within that body.
A more important factor that limited the extent of the impact achieved
by the movement was that, on the balance, the Executive Branch tended
to dominate the National Assembly in terms of bringing pressure to bear
on its members to toe the party line. While the Executive Branch deployed
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more carrots than sticks to achieve this end, they did not hesitate to use
sticks as well. The fact that the Executive Branch got the National
Assembly to fast track the bill through the legislative process is another
indication of the strength of its influence (NLC 2004b: 2 and 12). The
relevant Senate Committee took only about six days to study the bill and
report back to the Senate, a remarkably short timeline given the overall
record of the National Assembly (NAD 2004a: 0596–7). Even so, the
Senate President had originally asked the committee to report back in only
2 days (ibid.). The following tongue-in-cheek statement on the Senate floor
by a rebellious ruling party senator, Uche Chukwumerije, indicates the
widespread scepticism that greeted this extraordinarily swift passage of the
bill. In his words, ‘Mr. Chairman, I congratulate you and the Senate in
setting a record today. This might be one of the fastest Bills that have been
passed in history and I hope history will justify us ’ (NAD 2004b: 0853).
The National Assembly was definitely under pressure to quickly pass this
bill.
As importantly, the repressive tactics too often employed by the
Obasanjo government in seeking to crush or diffuse the movement’s mass
actions meant that the movement was on a few occasions a little more
hesitant to launch the kinds of protest from which it derived much of its
leverage (Okafor 2007: 80–5). This could not but have hindered its ability
to exert influence on the National Assembly, at least on some occasions.
And lastly, strong and concerted external pressures were imposed on
the Obasanjo government by key international economic power centres
(such as the Bretton Woods Institutions). These pressures ensured that the
regime tenaciously pushed ahead with the very economic reform agenda
(e.g. fuel price increases) that had put it on a collision course with both the
highly popular movement and the vast majority of the Nigerian people. As
a result, the Executive Arm developed a determination to weaken the
movement (the glue that held together and hardened the popular resist-
ance to its agenda).
: : :
This article has demonstrated that, during the period under study, a
labour-led movement has exerted considerable, albeit limited, influence
on legislative work in Nigeria. Largely as a result of this movement’s
struggles, the National Assembly was moved to mediate the fuel price hike
dispute between a dominant Executive Branch and the movement; lobby
the movement repeatedly to come to a compromise with the Executive
Branch regarding the fuel price dispute; re-orient some of its legislative
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processes ; explicitly oppose almost all of the Executive Arm’s fuel price
hikes ; and tone down considerably the anti-labour edge of a trade union
bill.
In its drive to achieve these contextually difficult objectives, the move-
ment was strengthened by its pro-poor (and thus highly popular) anti-fuel
price message and struggle ; its ownership and broad control by average
working people ; its internal democratic structure; its strong leadership; its
long experience of action for social change; its relative unity ; its national
geo-political location; its self-funded character ; and its mass mobilisation/
mass action mode of struggle. The movement also took advantage of the
reasonable measure of political space that existed in Nigeria’s quasi-
democratic clime, and the widespread socio-economic discontent that
pervaded the country. These characteristics and approaches helped the
movement to win the support of the vast majority of the Nigerian people
and, in turn, to acquire the political leverage that it needed in order to
persuade and/or pressure the National Assembly, in significant measure,
to orient its work in the direction desired by the movement.
As is evident from this discussion, the mass social movement character
exhibited by the labour-led movement was the pivotal factor that fa-
cilitated its ability to influence the National Assembly during the period
under study. Similarly situated movements will of course do well to learn a
thing or two from this insight.
N O T E S
1. Modelled after the US Congress, the National Assembly of Nigeria is composed of a Senate (the
upper house) and a House of Representatives (the lower house). For more information on the nature of
the National Assembly, see National Assembly (website).
2. Space and the necessity to avoid repeating a detailed analysis that has been done elsewhere does
not allow more detailed argument here regarding the way in which the anti-fuel price hike struggle is a
rights struggle. For more on this point see Okafor (in prep.).
3. See NLC Profile 2008; for an analogous conclusion stemming from a study of a labour-
led movement that operated in an earlier epoch in Nigeria see Onyeonoru & Aborisade 2001:
44–63.
4. The other confederation of labour unions in Nigeria, the Trade Union Congress (TUC), is
composed of senior staff unions, as opposed to the junior staff unions who constitute the NLC. See
TUC website.
5. Even state lawmakers from ruling party (PDP)-controlled state legislatures often expressed op-
position to the Federal Government’s fuel price hikes. For example, the PDP-controlled Delta-State
House of Assembly condemned the October 2003 round of fuel price increases and urged the HoR to
investigate it. See NAD 2003b: 1243.
6. Given Udombana’s argument that a right to form and join trade unions may be implied in the
guarantee of the right to freedom of association under Article 10 of the African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights, and the fact that Section 40 of the Nigerian Constitution explicitly guarantees this
right, this right may be said to exist in Nigeria. If that is so, it could be argued that, as a corollary, the
right to strike also exists under both normative documents. See African Charter (1981) ; Constitution of
Nigeria (1999). See also Udombana (2006: 191–2).
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